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Summary findings
Soviet  growth for 1960-89 was the worst in the world,  market  economies,  and whether this difficulty  was
after controlling  for investment  and human capital.  And  related to the Soviets'  planned  economic  system.)
relative  performance  worsens  over time.  Tentative  evidence  indicates  that the burdeni  ut defelns
Easterly  and Fischer explain the declining  Soviet  spending  also contributed  to rhe Soviet  debacle.
growth rate from 1950 to 1987 by the declining  Differences  in growth performance  betweern  tile SuvOe
marginal  product of capital.  The rate of total factor  republics  are explained  by the same  factors  that tigure  in
productivity  growth is roughly constant  over that period.  the empirical  cross-section  growth iiterature:  i, .al
Although  the Soviet  slowdown  has conventionally  been  income,  human capital population  growth, anO  the
attributed to extensive  growth (rising  capital-to-output  degree of sectoral  distortions.  The results  Easteily  and
ratios), extensive  growth is also a feature  of market-  Fischer  got with the Soviet  Union  in the internaiurial
oriented economies  like  Japan and Korea.  One message  cross-section  growth regression  indicate  that the planneui
from Easterly's  and Fischer's  results  could be that Soviet-  economic  system  itself  was disastrous  for long-i  un
style  stagnation  awaits  other countries  that have relied on  economic  growth in the Soviet  Union.
extensive  growth. The Soviet  experience  can be read as a  This point may now seem  obvious  but was not so
particularly  extreme dramatization  of the long-run  apparent in the halcyon  days of the 1950s,  wliei,  the
consequences  of extensive  growth.  Soviet  case was often cited as support for the neuLiassical
What led to the relative  Soviet  decline  was a low  model's  prediction  that distortions  do not havL  5Leady-
elasticity  of substitution  between  capital and iabor, which  state growth effects.  Since  a heavy  degree of piloining
caused  diminrishing  returns to capital to be especially  and government  intervention  exists  in many countries,
acute. (The natural  question to ask is why Soviet  capital-  e,  eciallv  developing  countries,  the ill fated Soviet
labor substitution  was more difficult than in Western  experience  continues  to be of interest.
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effort  in the department  to study  the determinants  of long-run  growth.  Copies  of the paper are available  free  from the Worid
Bank,  1818 H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact  Rebecca  Martin, room NI 1-043,  extension 3  1320  (56
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While  the final  collapse of the Soviet Union  and Soviet  communism  now appean  to have been
inevitable, It is esendal to try to pinpoint the causes of the economic  decline, without  which the Soviet
Union would still exist. The different  accounts  of the causes of declining  Soviet  economic  growth
developed  by Bergson  (1387b), Desai (1987), Ofer (1987), Weitzman  (1970)  and others emphasize:  the
Soviet reliance on extensive  growth which, given  the slow growth of the labor force and the failing
marginal  productivity  of capital, eventually  ran out of payoff; the declining  rate of productivity  growth
or technical  progress associated  with the difTiculties  of adopting  and adapting  to the sophisticated
technologics  being introduced  in the West (including  East Asia as part of the West);  the defense
burden; and a variety of special factors  relating  to the absence  of appropriate  incentives  in the Soviet
system, including  corruption and demoralization.
In this paper, we first place the Soviet  growth performance  in an international  context using the
empirical cross-section  growth literature. In section 1, we start with an overview  of the data and of the
Soviet  growth record, comparing  it to other countries  using a standarcd  growth regression. We compare
the Soviet  pattern of extensive  growth (rising capital to output ratiom)  to other countries. We reexamine
and update Soviet-level  production  function  estimates  based on the official,  unofficial  (by the Russian
economist  Khanin)l and western data, as well as examining  other historical  indicators  of the Soviet
growth pattern.  In section 11,  we turn to a new data set: official  data on republican  output, capital
stocks (both in constant, or as the Soviets  called it, comparable  prices), and employment  by sector.
These data have not previously  figured in the Western literature on Soviet  growth 2. The fact that the
republics will now have to operate  as independent  economic  units adds interest  to our republican-level
1Ericson  (1990)  argues  that  the  Khanirn  data  are  preferable  to the western  data  created  by Bergson  and  others;
Bergson  (199la, 1987a)  criticizes  the  Khanin  data  for  a poorly  documented  methodology  and  the  apparent  use  of
unweighted  averages  of physical  indicators.  Harrison  (1993)  provides  a more  sympathetic  analysis  of Khanin's  data,
emphasizing  his  attempts  to adjust  for  the reporting  biases  inherent  in the  Soviet  statistical  system.  We  are  grateful  to
Professor  Mark  Schaffer  for  making  the  Khanin  data  available.
2The  republican  data  were  provided  by Goskomstat  of the  Commonwealth  of Independent  States  and  by  the  Center
for  Economic  Analysis  and Forecasting  at  the  Ministry  of  Economics,  and  are available  from  Easterly  at  the  World
Bank,  1818  H Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433, We  rescaled  the  data  to reconcile  different  base  years  for  the data
in  compareble  prices.3
reso.  We disus  the patterns  of growth  by sector  and republic,  exploring  crou-section  correlations
beow  growth  of the Soviet  republics  or sectors  and  conventional  right-hand  side  variables  used  in
growth  regressions.  In the conclusion,  we offer  some  thoughts  on interpretation  of our results.
1.  Ihe  Soviet Growth  Record
lhe ftndamental  problem  in evaluating  Soviet  growth  is data  qualir  .3  Ofcial Soviet  output
data  overstate  growth,  as  a result  of both  methodological  problns  - particularly  in deflating  nominl
d"a, and  inentives  to mis eport  output  within  the Soviet  system. Western  analysis  of Soviet  growth
relies  on the elsic  studies  of Bergson  (1961),  and  other., as well  as the  CIA,  which  makes  the
working  assumption  that  physical  quantities  as presented  in the  otlicial  data  were  not  systematically
misreported.  Thus  the difference  between  the western  estimate  that  per capita  Soviet  GNP  increased
between  1928  and  1987  by 3.0 percent  per  annum  (4.3 percent  for aggregate  GNP)  and  the official
estimate  for NMP  per capita  of 6 percent  per  snnum  results  mostly  from  pricing  corrections,  and  also
from  differences  m the coverage  of NMP  and  GNP. 4 The classic  western  estimates  generally  assume
that  Soviet  invetment nd capital  data  are more  accurate  than  output  data  (Bergson  (1987a),  a view
disputed  by Wiles  (1982)).  The western  data  through  1985  are conveniently  summarized  in Ofer
(1987).
We  use four  different  data  sets  in the  empirical  work  in this  paper:
(1)  The  official  Soviet  Union-wide  data  on real  output,  industrial  production,  employment,  and  the
capital  stock  in the  material  sector  in 1973  rubles,  taken  from  official  sources;
(2)  Western  data on output,  industrial  production,  employment,  and  the  capital  stock,  for the
Soviet  Union  as a whole:  including
(a) the Powell(1963)/CIA(1982)/CIA  (various  years)  series  on value  added  and  capital  stocks
in indunry,  and
3T1his  discussion  draws  on material  in Fischer  (1992).
4The  Soviet  concept  of Net Material  Product  omitted  from GNP services  not directly  related  to production,  such as
pasenger transportation,  housing,  and the output  of government  employees  not producing  material  output.4
(b) the Moorsteen-Powell(1966)/Powell(1968)/CIA(1982)/CIA  (various years)/Kellogg(1989;
series on GNP, labor input, and capital stock for the entire economy. These series are chain linked,
using 1937 rubles for 19289-60,  in 1970  rubles for 1960-80,  and 1982  rubles for the 198ts.
(3)  Khanin's data, from Khanin  (1988), also at Soviet  Union-wide  level, for output, employment
and the capital stock in the material sector; and
(4)  Republic-level  data on aggregate  and sectoral output and inputs in the material  sectors for
1970-90  in constant  rubles, which were made available  by (ioskomstat.
The direct source of our datasets  (1) through (3) is Gomulka  and Schaffer  (1991), who spliced
together series from the sources described. Note that the Khanin  data are presented  for the material
sectors (i.e. not including  consumer  services), as are the official  data. Our preferred dataset for the
aggregate  data will be (2); the others are presented  to test the robustness  of the conclusions  to
alternative  estimates  of outputs  and inputs.
A) SOURT GROWTH  IN INTERMATIONAL  COMPARSON
Growth rates of series in the first three data sets for different periods are presented in Table 1.
The Western output  per worker growth rates are well below the official  rates, with the Khanin  data in
turn below the Westem data.  All series show growth  declining  sharply since the 1950s.
How does the Soviet  growth record compare to the rest of the world? We use the Western GDP
series to compare Soviet  per capita growth over 1960-89  with World Bank per capita growth rates for
102 countries  (we look here at per capita ratiner  than per worker growth to enlarge the sample  of
comparators  and make it consistent  with the cross-section  growth literature). The first column of Table
2 shows that Soviet  per capita growth has been slightly  above the global average over both 1960-89  and
1974-89.
However, Soviet  growth no longer looks respectable  once we control for the standard  growth
detemiinants  from the empirical literature. The last column of Table 2 shows the residual from
inserting  the Soviet  Union into the core regression  of Levine and Renelt (1992), which relates growth
to initial income, population  growth, secondary  enrollment,  and the investment  ratio to GDP. The
Levine-Renelt  regression  including  the Soviet Union  is as follows:S
Per  cap  ha  growth  60-89-  -0.83  + 17.49  Inwstment  60-89  -. 35  GDP  per  cavita  1960  +
(85)  (2.68)  (14)
3.16 * Secondary  enrollment  1960-  .38 Population  growth  6089 - 2.34  Dummyfor  USSR
(1.29)  (22)  (1.43)
103  observatioas,  R2  -.46.  (standard  errors  in  parentheses)
Except for population  growth,  Levine  and Renelt showed  these variables  to be robust to alternative
specifications  in growth  regressions  (although  concerns  about endogeneity  remain). The regression
results  are identical  to the Levine-Renelt  original  since we are dummying  out the Soviet  observation.
Excepting  initial income. the values of the Soviet  right-hand  side variables  should have implied
very rapid growth-population  growth was low, and secondary  education  and the investment  ratio were
near the top of the distribution. Growth was only average, hence the large negative  residual  of 2.3
percentage  points in 1960-89.  It is notable that the only countries  with worse residuals  are generally
both small and poor: Surinaine,  Jamaica, Guinea-Bissau,  Liberia, Zambia, and Peru. Soviet  per capita
income in 1989  was only half of what it would have been if the average relationship  between growth
and the right-hand  side variables  had held over 1960-89.
The Soviet residual in this OLS regression is not actually  significant  in a two-sided  test at the 5
percent level. However, the presence of so many small and poor countries  among  the large outliers
makes us suspect  heteroskedasticity. The suspicion  is justified. We split the 1960-89  sample  into thirds
on the basis of total real GDP (i.e. population  times PPP per capita income)  and rerun the above
regression for the top and bottom  thirds ranked by total GDP. (The USSR is included  in the top third
ranked by total GDP and we continue  to dummny  it out.)  The Goldfeld-Quandt  test statistic  for
heteroskedasticity  - which is equal to the ratio of the sum of squared residuals  in these two subsample
regressions  and is distributed  as an F statistic  with the number  of degrees  of freedom  of the numerator
and denominator  corresponding  to the degrees of freedom in the subsample  regressions  - indicates  that
we can reject homoscedasticity.  The test results are as follows:
Sum of squared  residuals  in third of sample with lowest  real GDP:  88.3
Sum of squared  residuals  in third of sample with  highest  real GDP: 33.9
F (29, 28) =  2.61 (significant  at 1 percent level)6
3aod on the test results, we now perform weighted  least square  using  the lo  of total real GDP u  the
weighting  series.  The results are now as follows:
Per capita growth 60-89- -0.43 + 15.93 Investment  60-89 -.28 GDP  per capita 1960 +
( 73)  (2.19)  (.08)
2.56 * Secondary  enrollment  1960  - .24 Population  g&owth  60-89  - 2.28  Dummyfor USSR
(0.73)  (.16)  ;3.  48)
102 observations,  R2 (weighted)  -.84. R2 (unweighted)  =-41.
The Soviet  dummny  becomes  highly  significant  with weighted  least squares, with a t-statistic  of
4.8. Taking into account that only countries  doing worst than the USSR  were small economies  makes
the Soviet  performance  look even worse. After correcting  for heteroskedasticity,  the Soviet  economnic
performance  conditional  on investment  and human capital  accumulation  was the worst in the world
over 1960-89.
How does the comparative  Soviet  performance  evolve over time? Since  the World Bank data
used by Levine and Renelt begins only in 1960, we compare  the Soviet  performance  also with the
cross-country  Summers-Heston  (1991)  dataset that extends  back to ' )50.  We perform a pooled  time-
series, cross-section  regression  using decade averages for the same specification  as before (except that
we have to unfortunately  omit the secondary  enro!lment  variable for lack of reliable Soviet  data for the
1950s).  We use the same Soviet  data as in the previous regression, but now broken down by decade.
We put intercept  dummies  for each decade, as well as a separate Soviet  dummy for each decade. We
continue  to use weighted  least squares  with the weighting  series being the log of total GDP, as the
Goldfeld-Quandt  statistic  still indicates  a significantly  larger variance for small economies. 5 The results
are:
5The  F-statistic  for the ratio of the sum of squared  residuals  in the bottom  third to that in the top third of the sample
ranked  by  total  GDP  (in PPP  prices  from  Summers-Heston  (1991))  is  F(  124,121)=2.03,  which  is significant  at the I
percent  level.7
Pr. cpia  roih  by  dwca - 0 022  +.120  InvestmenGDP  by  dck  - I 5E  06  GDPp capiet,  initialye.y
(005) (016)  (3.6E-07)
.626  Popidauongrowh  bydwde + .005  60sdummy-  .005  70sdummy-.015  80 dummy
(143)  (.004)  (.O33)  (003)
+ .024  Dummyfor  USSR  50s  - 008  Dummyfor  USSR  60s  - 017  Dummyfor  USSR  70s
(01))  (010)  (009)
-.  023 DumyYfor USSR  80J
(009)
391  obueruao.,  R2  (wighte) -.54,  R2  (unweighied)  -.26
As is well known, world economic  growth decelerated  in the 70s and even more in the 80s. However
the Soviet  growth deceleration  is notable  even by comparison  with the world  pattemn:  Scviet  economic
mrowth  was significantly  above  the world average in the 1950s,  and significantly  below  even the poor
world growth of the 1980s. Note especially  the good performance  of the Soviet Union in the 1950s,
even controlling  for high investment:  it suggests  that whatever  the weaknesses  of Soviet  central
planning  in hindsight,  these weaknesses  were unlikely  to have been apparent  prior to 1960.
5) POSSIBLE  EXPLANATIONS  FOR  POOR  AND  DECNING SOVIET  GROWTH
We now consider  other possible factors in the relative  Soviet  decline, including  the defense
burden, demoralization,  and Soviet  disincentives  for innovation.  Could the poor and declining  growth
performance  be explained  by the burden of defense  on the Soviet  economy?  Although  measurement  is
problematic,  the burden seems to have been high and rising. In Table 3, we show some estimates  of the
Soviet  defense  burden as a share of GDP.  Over the entire period  since 1928,  Soviet defense  spending
has risen from 2 percent of GDP to the much higher levels  of the mid-and  late-1980s,  of around 15-16
percent of GDP.  Over the period 1960-89  in which the Soviet growth  decline occurred, the rise in the
defense burden is more modest  - from 10-13%  in 1960 to 12-169%  in the 1980s.
The international  evidence for adverse  effects  of defense  spending on growth is ambiguous  -
see Landau (1993)  for a recent survey. Landau  (1993)  himself finds an inverted U relationship:  military
spending below 9 percent of GDP has a positive  effect on growth, but defense  above  9 percent of GDP
has a negative  effect on growth. To see whether  this affects the Soviet  dummy in the growth
regressions,  we insert defense spending  into the decade-average  growth regressions  performed  earlier.We also  include  a  variable  meaurin  war  casualties  per capita  on national  torritory  to inswu  that  the
military  spending  variable  is not  simply  proxying  for wars.  Because  the  military  spending  data  is only
available  for recent  periods,  we use data  from  the 1980.  only.6 The regression  including  a quadratic
function  of military  spending  is as follows:
Per  capita  growth  198C-88  - -0.003  + i 27 InvwtmeP/GDP  1980-88  2.  7E-064  GDP  per  capita  1980  +
(017) (038)  (. IE-06)
-1.  34 Population  growth,  1980-88 +  .007  Secondary  enrollment  1970  + .0081  MilItory spending/GDP
(38)  (017)  (.0024)
-.00041  (Miltary  sp.ndlng/GDP) 2 -0.746  War  caswalti  per  capita  -.0155  Dummyffor  USSR
(0001)  (0.343)  (.0268)
IS wigshted  by  log  of  total  GDP.  77  observation,,  R2  (weighted)  -.59,  R2  (unrnwighted)  -.30 Standard  ecors  in
penthes.
We confirm Landau's result  of an inv'ted  U-shaped  relationship  between growth and defense
spending.  Military spenduig reduces  the magnitude  and significance  of the Sovie;  dummy. However, as
Landau  also noted  '-is result is not very robust - omitting  Syria and Israel from our sample eliminates
the significance  of military spending. The defense  explanation  for the Sov.et decline  is plausible  but
not firmly established  with cross-section  data. We will test the defense  hypothesis  further  with the
Soviet  time series in the production  function  estimates  below.
Another hypothesis  about  the Soviet  growth decline  is that it was related to the increasing
demoralizatioi.  of the population,  or alternatively  to the increasing  breakdown  of worker discipline.
This breakdown of discipline  could have resulted  from the gradual opening  up of the Soviet  systern,
and the declining  reliance on state terror.
Demoralization  is obviously  hard to measure, but we present some fragments  of evidence.  One
statistic  relevant to demoralization  is shown in Figure 1, which represents  the results of a survey of
emigres  which asked how satisfied  they had been with the standard  of living in the USSR. The young
had been less suisfied than the old.  Among  the many possible  explanations  for these results is that
6Landau  only  coven developing  countries,  so  we  use  instead  dat from  Hewitt  (1993)  dut covers  all  countries
(including  the  USSR  itself).  The  data  for  both  Landau  and Hewitt  is mainly  from  SIPRI  (the  Stockholm  Intemational
Peace  Resarch Institute).  The  data  on war  casualties  is from  Eaterly,  Kremer,  Pritchett,  and  Summers  (1993).9
declining  growth and disappointed  expectations  among  the young were mutually  reirfbrcinr.7
Other indicators  of life in the Soviet Union  also support the idea of a system breaking  down.
Westem specialists  were amazed  to leam that Soviet  male life expectancy  actually  declined  in the 1970s
while other countries' (male) life expectancy  rates were rising(Fiiure 2). Soviet  life expectancy  wu
declining  even though per capita income  growth was slightly  above the world average, as we have
seen. There was a recovery in Soviet  life expectancy  in the 80s, but the USSR  was stUi  supassed
during the decade by developing  countries  like Mexico.'
Another possible  explanation  for poor and declining  Soviet  growth could  be adverse incendves
under central planning  for technological  innovation  (Berliner  (1976)). A recent theoretical  and
empirical literature argues that endogenous  technological  innovation,  as measured  by resources  devoted
to research and development  (R&D), significantly  explains  reladve growth  performance  across
countries  (Coe and Helpman  (1993), Lichtenburg  (1992), Romer (1989); see Birdsall  and Rhee (1993)
for a dissenting  view).
Westem estimates  of the Soviet  research effort, presented in Figure 3, show R&D spending
rising as a share of GNP. The R&D share is above  the 2-3 percent in the leading industrialized
countries. In 1967, about 1.5 percentage  points of this was estimated  to be for defense  and space
(Bergson, 1983). The share of defense  and space R&D in total R&D is believed  to have fallen over
1959-84  (Acland-Hood  (1987)), implying  an even steeper rise in civilian  R&D. The data on Soviet
R&D thus go in the wrong direction  to explain either poor Soviet  growth on average or the fall of
Soviet  growth over timne.
7Among  the other  explanations:  the  young  are  chronic  complainers;  the  old  remember  the  period  of much  lower
consumption  before  the  rapid  Soviet  growth  of the 1950s;  the  authorities  resisted  emigration  by the  young,  so  that
any  young  emigre  had  to be more  determined  and  disgruntled  than  the  average  emigre.  Al>, since  the  original
source  did not  report  standard  deviations  within  the  sample  groups,  we are  unsure  whether  the  differences  are
statist,cally  significant.
'One factor  could  have  been  the  sharply  rising  consumpdon  of alcohol  in  the 60s,  70s,  and early  1  980s,  which  itself
may  be an independent  indicator  of demoralization  (TremI  1991).  However,  we  are  reluctant  to make  too much  of
this  since  some  countries  with  rapid  income  increases  - like  Korea  - ilso had  shaply rising  alcohol  consumption.10
C) THE  EA7ENSIVE  GROWrH  HYPOTHESIS
As noted, in the introduction,  the conventional  hypothesis  for the Soviet  growth decline is the
pattem of extensive  growth, defined  by Ofer (1987) as a rising ca; ital-output  ratio, Figure 4 shows  the
evolution  of the capital-output  ratios implied  by the alternative  data series for 1950-87.' The wstern
series shows the capital-output  ratio increasing  two and &  half times between 1950  and 1987. The
official series also rises steadily  beginning  at the end of the S0s, more thar.  doubling  tetween 1958  ad
1987. The Khanin  data, by contrast  with the other two series, show only a small increase in the
capital-output  ratio between  the early 1950s  and 1987. The capital-output  ratios  in industry first
decline in the S0s and then rise sharply after 1960, according  to both Western  and official  estimates.
The behavior  of the capital-output  ratio is central to the debate about whether  reliance on
extensive growth was the Achilles' Heel  of Soviet  industrialization,  as the conventional  wisdom  has it.
In the neoclassical  model, a rising capital-output  ratio implies  capital deepening  during the transition to
a higher steady state, but this capital deepening  will sooner or later run into  dininishing returns that
will cause growth to slow or stop. The Soviet  reliance  on capital deepening  is implicitly  contrasted  with
market economies,  where according to the famous Kaldor stylized  fact, capital-output  ratios remain
relatively  stable (recently  reaffirmed  by Rorrer (1990)). A constant  capital-output  ratio is consistent
with neoclassical  steady  state growth with labor-augmenting  technical change. King and Rebelo (1993)
argue that capital deepening  cannot  account for much of sustained  economic  growth in the neoclassical
model without  implying  imnplausibly  high rates of return to capital early in the transition  process.
Nevertheless,  recent research  on capital accumulation  in market economies  casts doubt on
whether the Soviet  extensive  growth experience  was unique. Appendix 1 lists the per annum  growth
rates of the capital-output  ratios in a selection  of recent growth accounting  studies  and a few older ones.
All studies agree that the capital-output  ratio in the U.S. has remained  remarkably  constant, which
9We  begin  the  graphs  in 1950  because  we  wre  puzzled  by  the  extreme  volatility  of all  of the  capital-output  series
before 1950.  We conclude  that  more  even  than the usual caution  should  be attached  to results  that rely on pre-1950
data.11
perhaps accounts  for the conventional  wisdom  that Kaldor's stylized  fact holds. However,  a number  of
recent studies point to capital-output  ratios rising at Soviet-style  rates in Jpn  and in some of the E'st
Asian NICs such as Korea (Young  (1993b),  Kim and Lau (1993), King and Levine (1994),  Benhabib
and Spiegel  (1992), Nehru and Dhareshwar  k,.993)).
Moreover, the latter three, cross-country,  studies  show that rising capital-output  ratios are a
feature of growth for many countries.  1 0 The three studies compute  capital stocks  for a large sample  of
countries,  using a variety of data sources  (Summers-Heston  versus World Bank)  and a variety of
assumptions  about initial  capital stocks and depreciation  rates. The three concur that rising capital-
output ratios are by no means rare: the median capital-output  ratio growth of their respective  samples  is
around 1 percent per annum, and fully a quarter of the samples' capital-output  ratio growth rates are
over 1.7 percent per annum.  11 Nor is it only developing  countries  that are shown to have rapid
capital-deepening. For example,  the studies  concur that capital-output  ratios in Austria and France
increased at over 1.5 percent per annum. The literature on extensive  growth as the bane of Soviet
development  did not recognize  that extensive  growth  also occurred in market economies,  and
sometimes  with striking  results as in Japan and Korea. What is notable about  the Soviet  experience  was
not the extensive growth, but the low payoff to the extensive  growth.
As either a cause or a consequence  of the low payoff, the level of the Soviet  capital-output  (K-
Y) ratio had become extreme by the 1980s.  The K-Y ratio as measured  by the Westem GDP and total
capital  stock series was 4.9 in 1985, which is higher than any of the 1985  K-Y ratios  in the Benhabib-
Spiegel  and King-Levine  exercises. In the Nehru-Dhareshwar  sample, there are only four countries
with a K-Y ratio above the Soviets  in 1985, none of which seem especially  relevant  as comparators  -
Guyana, Zambia, Jamaica, and Mozambique.
One other implication  of the extensive  growth model is that investment  ratios have to rise over
I See  also  Judson  (1994),  who  shows  the  capital-output  ratio  rising  systematically  with  income.
I  IFor  the  two  studies  that  use Summers-Heston  data  (Benhabib  and  Spiegel  1993  and  King  and Levine  1994),  we
omit  Africa  from  the  sample  because  investment  to GDP  ratios  are  implausibly  extreme  (both  high  and low)  in  the
1950s.12
time if growth is to be maintained  while the capit%l  output  ratio rises.  As has previously  been
highlighted  in the literature  (see Ofer (1987))  the Soviet  investment  share doubled  between 1950  and
1975. as can be seen in the CIA estimates  presented  in Figure 5. After 1975,  the investment  share
continued  to increase, but more slowly.
How unusual is the doubling  of the investment  rate over a 25 year period? In the Summers
and Heston (1991) international  database  for 1950-75,  8 out of 52 countries  - most notably  Japan and
Taiwan  - had a doubling  or more of investment  rates.12 Shifting  the sample  period forward  by 10
years to expand the sample,  6 out of 72 countries  had a more than doubling  of investment  over 1960-
85, among  which Korea and Singapore  are of particular  interest. Soviet  investment  mobilizadon  wa  at
a level that was above average, but not unknown,  among  market economies.
The stand-by  of Soviet industrialization,  machinery  and equipment  investment,  also increased
sharply as growth  declined. The importance  of this sector to growth has been emphasized  by de Long
and Sununers  (1991, 1992, 1993); the Soviet  data suggest  a high ratio of machinery  investment  to GNP
is not sufficient  to generate growth.
D) PRODUCTION  FUNCTIONS  AND EXTENSIVE  GROWTH
Another way to evaluate  the extensive  growth  hypothesis  is to do the traditional  total factor
productivity  calculation. For the TFP calculation,  there is little difference  between  the official  and
westem data on factor input  growth while  Khanin shows  substantially  lower rates of growth of capital
(Table 1). This is a consequence  in part of Khanin's view that hidden inflation  is as serious in capital
goods industries  as in consumer  goods, a view shared by the "British  school" of Hanson (19U), Nove
(1981), and Wiles  (1982).
In Table 4 we show summary  statisics for productivity  growth for the USSR, ;lculated
assuming  a Cobb-Douglas  production  function  with labor's share equal to .6 and the share of capital
equal to .4 (slightly  above that used by Bergson  and the CIA, but within the conventional  range for
12We contiue to exclude  Afiica.-  countries  from  this  and  the  following  sample.13
developing  countries)  for alternative  data series.  13 With the assumption  of Cobb-Douglas  production
(unit elasticity  of substitution  between  capital and labor) we see a strongly declining  trend in TFP
growth after the 1950's.
The most interesting  aspect of Table 4 is that the 1950s  once more stand out as an exceptional
period in Soviet  growth. It is especially  striking  that even the western  data for the industrial  sector
Lnply  productivity  growth in that decade of more than 6 percent per annum. Note the remarkable
divergences  of views about perfornance in the 1930s  that emerge from Table 4, with official  Soviet
data showing  extraordinary  rates of productivity  growth and Khanin  and western  GNP data imnplying
negative  rates.
Westem GNP data present the most pessimistic  assessment  of Soviet  productivity  performance,
implying  that productivity  growth in the Soviet Union  was positive  only in the 1950s. The Khanin data,
which uniformily  exhibit lower overall growth than western GNP data, by contrast imply positive
post-1950  productivity  growth, a result of the lower rates of growth of capital in the Khanin series.
The data in Table 4 point to one extremely  important  feature of the Soviet  growth slowdown:
estimated  productivity  growth for the industrial  sector was positive  until the 1980s. This locates  the
major slowdown  of productivity  in the non-industrial  sector. Looking  ahead to Table 7, using  the
aggregate  of the republican  data for 1970-90,  the biggest  problem was in agriculture,  where
productivity  appears  to have declined  by 4 percent per annum, with construction  and trade and
procurement  showing  small positive  rates of productivity  growth. 14
Following  the pioneering  work of Weitzman  (1970, 1983)  and later zontributions  (Desai (1976,
13t has  long  been  a stylized  fact  in the  development  literature  that  capital  shares  are  higher  in developing  than
developed  countries  (see  for  example  De  Gregorio's  (1992)  estimate  that  the  capital  share  is between  .4 and  .55  for
Latin  America).  Westem  estimates  of Soviet  per  capita  income  suggest  it was  a developing  rather  than  a developed
country.
1 4Previous  estimates  of productivity  growth  in agriculture  were  less  drastic  but  still  showed  poor  performance.
Diamond,  Bettis,  and  Ramson  (1983)  show  productivity  growth  in agriculture  of 0.2  percent  over 1971-79.  Brooks
(1983)  show  -d zero  agricultural  productivity  growth  over 1960-80.  We  are  not  sure  how  our  calculation  of  negative
agricultural  productivity  growth  relates  to Desai's  (1992)  evidence  that  weather-adjusted  grain  yields  were  rising
rapidly  in the 1980s,  unless  the increase  in yields  was  obtained  through  massive  increases  in inputs.14
1987),  Bergson (1979), and others), we also investigate  whether  CES functions  provide a boeer
representation  of the data than the Cobb-Douglas  production  function  inposed in calculating  the TFP
estimates  in Table 4.
Weitzman's basic finding  was that a CES producdon  function  with a low eluticity of
substitution  of 0.4 fit the data better than the Cobb-Dougla, and that the hypotheis that the ebsticity
of subsdtution  was one could be rejected. Bergson  (1983) cridcized this result, on the grounds  that it
implied  implausibly  high estimates  of the marginal  product  of capital in earlier yea.  Desai (1987)
concurred with Weitzman's finding  for aggregate  industry,  but claimed  that Cobb-Douglas  was an
adequate  representadon  for some branches  of industry.
Estimation  of production  functions  in industrial  countries  is the subject of a large literaure.
The usual method is to estimate  parameters  of factor demands  derived from the cost funcdon, the dual
of the production  function  (see Jorgenson  (1983) for a survey). This is obviously  inappropriate  for a
non-market  economy like the Soviet  Union. Direct estimadon  of production  funtions  is usually
thought  to be tainted  by endogeneity  of the factor supplies, particularly  capital; we believe  this would
be much less of a problem in the non-market  system of the USSR. Table 5 shows  elasticities  of
substitution  estirnated  by nonlinear  least squares (see Appendix  2 for the regressions),  and recalcubted
TFP growth rates for 1950-87  (assuming  Hicks-neutral  technical  progress) for subperiods  with the CBS
form:
ln(Y/L) = cl  *Time*D5059  + c2*Time*D6069  + c3*Time*D7079  + c4*Time*D8087
+ c5* ln[c6*(K/L)lI/c5  + (1-c6)] + c7
We find indeed that, with the exception  of the estimatea  based on the Khanin  data, all of the altermative
estinates of Soviet  output and capital  growth per worker lend themselves  to the CES form with low
elasticities  of substitution  between  capital and labor (signiflcantly  below one).l5 The results are less
ISA  clasic uticle by Diamnond,  McFadden,  and Rodriguez  (1967)  shows  that  it is in general  impossible  to identify
sepurely a time-varying  elasticity  of substitudon  pamneter  and  the  bia of technical  change  (neutral  verus labor-
augmenting  etc.) We  identify  the  substitution  paraneter  by presuming  that  it is constant  over  time  and  that  technical
change  is neutral.1s
sharp when we use the entire sample 1928-87,  where as indicated  earlier the data before 1950  are
volatile. Serial correlation is a problem  for most of the estimates,  with the significant  exception  of the
results  using our preferred Western  GDP series for 1950-87.
The results with the Khanin  data are intriguing  because they support a story of unit elaticity of
substitution  and poor (though not necessarily  declining)  productivity  growth. According  to the Khanin
data, growth declines mainly because  capital  growth  slowed (see Table 1 again). Given Bergson's
criticisms  and the limited information  about  the methodology  behind the Khanin  data, these differing
results can only point to the need for further  research into Khanin's approach  to see wheher his work
represents  a valid criticism of the Western  estimates.  For the moment, we are forced  to regard the
Khlanin  story as unproven.  16
The low elasticity of substitution  from the other data series gives us an important  insight  into
the lack of success of the Soviet  extensive  growth strategy  compared to the high payoffs  from capital
deepening  in Japan, Korea, and other market economies. The literature does not find the elastdcity  of
substitution  between  capital and labor in market economies  to be greatly below one (see for example,
Berndt  and Wood (1975) and Prywes (1983)  for discussion  of theirs and other results for U.S.
manufacturing).  A recent study estimating  the elasticity  parameter from the convergence  behavior of
the cross-sectional  national per capita income  data even argues that the elasticity  of substitution  is
slightly  ABOVE  one (Chua (1993)). Diminishing  returns to extensive  growth  were much sharper in the
USSR than in market economies  because  the substitutability  of capital for labor was abnormally  low.
In the concluding  section, we will speculate  why substitutability  may have been low in a planned
economy.
Another striking feature of Table S is that the implied  rates of TFP growth show no significant
decline  between the 50s and 80s. Thus, freeing  up the functional  form of the production  function  rules
1 6We  would  have  liked  to examine  the  implications  of the  "British  school"  of Hanson  (1984),  Nove  (1981),  and
Wiles  (1982),  who  somewhat  similar  claims  to Khanin's.  However,  we cannot  do so  since  those  researchers  do not
provide  alternative  time  series  for  output  and  capital.  Note  that  a lower  estimae  for  the  growth  rae of capital  over
the  entire  period,  as  implied  by  the  "British"  arguments,  would  imply  higher  TFP  growth  but does  not imply  anything
about  the  estimated  elasticity  of substitution  that  would  resuk  from  using  such  data.16
out the collapsing  productivity  growth explanation  for declining  growth: in Table 4, both extensive
growth and declini  productivity  growth  account for the overall fall in growth; in Table 5 the fault lies
endrely with dlminishing  retuan to capital.
Table S also shows  that the level of TFP growth is more plausible  after we control for the
shrply  falling marginal  product of capital with a low elasticity  of substitution. Our preferred estimates
are toe  yielded by the Western  GDP estimates  in the last column in Table S for the 1950-87  sanple.
Those estimates  yield a constant TFP growth rate of I percent per annum, in contrast to the negative
TFP growth implied  by the Cobb-Douglas  estimates  in Table 4 for the 60s through the 80s. We find a
positive  rate of TFP growth with falling  returns to capital  more plausible than a negative  rate of TFP
growth.
In Figure 6 we examine  a second implication  of the estimates  in Table 5: these are estimates  of
the *share  of capital" implied  by the alternative  columns  in Table 5 for 1950-87,  assuming  marginal
productivity  pricing. In the graph, we present  only the more reliable western  data.  For total GNP, the
share of capital falls  steadily throughout. For industrial  output, the implied  share of capital would  have
been close to one until the mid-50s, and it then would have begun a sharp decline  to close to zero by
1980.
In Figure 7 we present closely  related data, on the marginal  product  of capital implied  by the
CES estimates. The western GNP data imply high rates of return to capital in the early 50s, declining
to about 3 percent in 1987. The 1950  marginal  product  of capital in industry is lower than that implied
by the GDP estimates. It stays constant  throughout  the 50s, then declines  sharply to zero by the late
70s.
The data presented  in Figures 6 and 7 suggest  that a market economy  could not have gone
through the growth process of the Soviet  economy  between 1928  and 1987. The very low wage shares
in the early period would  probably have prevented  any but a subsistence  wage equilibrium  in those
periods. The essentially  zero marginal  product  of capital  in industry (estimated  using western data) by
the mid-80s would have been inconsistent  with equilibrium,  and would  have meant that investment  in
industry  and the capital-labor  ratio would have been lower.17
What would have happened  in the early years if there had been a market economy? One
posibility  is that some method-such as trade unions-would have been found  to divorce factor
payments from marginal  productivities. Another  possibility  is that different technologies  would  have
been adopted. Similarly,  in the later period, there may well have been other technologies  available  that
yielded a positive return to capital. It is also possible that if the extensive  growth  route had been closed
off in a market economy,  there would  have been more incendve  for Soviet  entrepreneurs  to attempt  to
imnprove  technology.
The high capital  share in the CES production  functions  before 1960  has one other implicadon
we find interesting. A CES function  with a high capital share acts much like a linear function  of
apital, so that the marginal  product of capital can stay flat for as long as the capital share is high (see
the line for indutrial capital's marginal  product in the SOs  in figure 7).  With a very capital-intensive
producdon of goods, including  capital  goods, the Soviets were close for a while to the model of
growth through rapid reproduction  of capital  - described  by Feldman  in the 1920s  as using "machines
to make more machines"  (see Dornar  (1957)).17
However, as the capital  share begins to fall, the marginal  product  will begin to decline. The
decline can be precipitous  when  the elasticity  of substitution  is particularly  low (see the industrial
marginal product in the late 50s and early 60s). While we find the extreme  values  of the marginal
product of capital and capital's share in Figures 6 and 7 surprising, they do not logically rule out the
CES form-the capital-labor  ratio in a non-market  economy  could be driven  to levels that would not be
observed in a market economy.
E) COMBINING  REGRESSION  EVIDENCE  WITH  PRODUCTION  FUNCTION  ESTIMATES
As a final exercise, we insert  the other apparent correlate of declining  growth  - defense
spending _ into our production  function  estimates  (we take the midpoint  of the Brada and Graves
estimates  in Table 3 spliced together with the Steinberg  estimate  for 1985-87). Specifically,  we allow
17Rebelo  (1991) shows  formally  that  constant  retums to reproducible  factors  in  the capital  goods sector is sufficient
to geneate a constant,  sustained  rate of growth  even  without  TFP growth.18
the Hicks-neutral  rate of technological  progress to depend  linearly on the share of defense  spending in
GDP in the production  hnction estimated  with Western  GDP and capital stock data:
ln(Y/L) - cl*nme  + c2*nme*(Defenre  Spending)  + c3* ln[c4*(KfL)l/C 3 + (1-c4)]  + C5
The  results are shown in Appendix  2. We find defense  spending  does indeed  have a significant  and
negative  effect on the rate of incr.ase in the total productivity  term in the production  function.
However, the effect is not very quantitatively  important:  every additional  1 percent of GDP spent on
defense  lowered productivity  growth by .07 percent. The increase over 1960-87  of 2.2 percentage
points in the defense  share thus would have lowered  growth by .15 percentage  points. Moreover, the
parameters  of the CES function  are virtually  unchanged  from our earlier regression  so the low
substitutability,  diminishing  returns story still holds We also tried equipment  investment  and R&D
spending  as independent  influences  on the technical  progress term, but both gave insignificant  results.
How do we reconcile  our production  function  estimates  with our earlier cross-section  growth
regression  evidence  using the Levine-Renelt  specification? The Soviets' high capital-output  ratio and
low substitutability  of capital for labor  implies a lower derivative  of growth with respect  to the
investment  rate than in other countries  with lower K-Y ratios and more substitutable  capital for labor.
To see this, assume zero depreciation  and labor growth for simplicity  and set labor =  1 by choice of
units. Assume  a CES function  Y=A(yKP+ I-y)(l/P).  Growth  will be given  as a function  of the
investment  ratio (I/Y = AK/Y)  as follows:
AY/Y = y  (I/Y) [ (K/Y) (y+(l-y)K-P)  ]-I
As is well known, a higher K/Y implies  a lower marginal  effect of the investment  ratio on growth
simply because  a given investment  rate translates  into lower capital growth. With a unit elasticity  of
substitution  (p=O), this is the only way that the level of capital influences  the marginal  effect of
investment.  With a less than unit elasticity  of substitution  (p < 0), higher capital  has an even stronger
negative  effect on the coefficient  on investment  in a growth equation. Although  obviously  not the only
explanation,  this is consistent  with the large negative  residual  for the USSR  -- and increasingly  negative
residuals  over time - in the cross-section  regressions. (With only one observation,  we cannot
distinguish  between  a Soviet slope dununy on the investmnent  coefficient  and a Soviet intercept  dummy.)19
We conclude  from  our reexamination  of the aggregate  data  that  the original  Weitzman  story
holds  up. Soviet  growth  declined  because  of diminihig returns  to capital  accumulation,  and  not
because  of a slowdown  in TFP  growth. The average  growth  performance  was  poor  when  we take  into
account  the rapid  capital  growth  and  high  education  levels. The general  extensive  growth  hypothesis  of
the  literature  on Soviet  growth  is not  sufficient  explanadon  by itself,  because  in a comparative  context
we find  that  Soviet  extensive  growth  was  not  that  unusual.  It was  the low  substitutability  of capital  for
labor,  rather  than  extensive  growth  per  se, that  was the  fatal  weakness  of the  Soviet  development
strategy.
11.  R  _Ub_ican  RMlts  - Capitl  Growth  and  _ow  la  Growth
The republican  time  series  cover  the  period 1970-90,  and  provide  detailed  data  to describe  the
economic  decline  in the final  years  of the Soviet  system,  by republic  and  by sector. The data  are for
NMP. Table  6 shows  least-squares  estimates  of real  NMP  growth  per worker  in the USSR  and the
republics,  overall,  and  by branch  of industry,  for the  years  1970-90.  Growth  rates  in the Central  Asian
republics  were  well  below  those  in the rest  of the Soviet  Union,  with  Belarus  and  Georgia  having  the
highest  rates  of output  growth. Among  the Central  Asian  republics,  Turkmenistan  experienced
negative  growth  of per worker  output  over the  20-year  period;  the growth  rate  of per worker  output  of
Kyrgyzstan,  the most  rapidly  growing  of the  Central  Asian  republics  was nonetheless  a full percentage
point  below  that  of the slowest-growing  of the  other  republics,  Azerbaijan.  Growth  performance  in the
Baltics  does  not stand  out  relative  to the  Soviet  average.
Across  branches,  output  per  worker  grew  most  rapidly  in industry,  and  at a negative  rate  in
agriculture;  output  growth  in the  service  sectors,  transport  and  communications,  and  trade  and
procurement,  was  positive. Belarus  shows  the  highest  rate  of growth  of output  per worker  in industry;
Lithuania,  where  aggregate  growth  was  relatively  low,  also  shows  rapid  output  growth  in industry.
The slow  growth  of output  in the Central  Asian  republics  clearly  owes  much  to the  poor  performance
of agriculture  in these  relatively  agricultural  republics.
Table  7 shows  estimates  of TFP  growth  (computed  assuming  a 0.4 capital  share  for all sectors20
and a Cobb-Douglas  form) by sector and by republic.  18 Judging  by TFP growth, industry  did
relatively  better than other sectors in the European  USSR Oust  as industrial  productivity  growth is
usually higher than other sectors in the West), while agriculture  was a disaster everywhere.  Transport
and communications  did well in the border regions  of Belams  and the Baltics. Productivity  growth in
construction  and in trade is uneven and generally  close  to zero.  Central Asia is an almost  unrelieved
tale of woe for all sectors, with Kyrgyzstan  standing  out again as having  the best performance  in that
region.
For the entire material sector's TFP growth, Georgia  and Belarus  did the best over 1970-90,
Armenia, Azerbaijan,  Latvia, and Estonia, the next best, and Central Asia the worst. The relative
success  of Belarus  and Georgia  was due entirely  to industry, with productivity  performance  in
agriculture  still disastrous,  and performance  in the transport/communications/construction  sectors
generally  poor.
The relative  performance  of the republics  shown  here is broadly consistent  with previous
studies focusing  on earlier periods. The ranking  of TFP growth  by republic for the period 1960-75  in
Koropeckyj  (1981)  is similar to that in Table 7: Belarus  is at the top, and Central Asia at the bottom.
Whitehouse  (1984)  presents similar findings  for 1961-70:  Belarus  and Georgia  are third and fourth in
productivity  growth  (Latvia and Estonia  are at the top), with Central Asia again firmly ensconced  at the
bottom. The bad Central Asian outcome  is well known  in the literature (for example, Rumer(1989)).
A) EXPLWNING  RELATIVE  PERFORMANCE  WITHIN  THE USSR
Growth  by republic is correlated with some of the same  factors - human :apital, initial income,
and population  growth  - that have been singled  out in recent cross-sectional  growth regressions  (Barro
(1991), Barro and Lee (1993), Levine and Renelt (1992)). We first examine  simp'e correlations
between  estimated  productivity  growth over the period and these factors, and then present the results  of
a multiple  regression.
I t We  are  rather  embarrassed  to resort  to the  Cobb-Douglas  form  for  the  republican  sectors  after  rejecting  it for  the
Soviet  Union  as a whole  in section  1. The  republican  data  series  are  too  short  to lend  themselves  to CES  estimation
of individual  production  functions.  The  Cobb-Douglas  TFP  growth  rates  are  still  useful  descriptive  statistics.21
Pigue  8 shows the associadon  between  one measure  of human  capial - the percentage  of
specblists with higher education  per capita - and productivity  growth. The negative  productivity
growth of the Central Asian republics  is associated  with a low level of higher education,  while  the
relatively high growth of Georgia, Latvia, Estonia,  and Amenia is strikingly  correlated  with a high
proportion of highly-trained  specialists. Belarus  is well above the implied  regression line, reflecting  its
relatively low dwhre  of higher education  specialists. Sinilarly, the Central Asian  republics' poor record
is associated  with rapid population  growth (Figure 9).
We have also run a standard  cross-sectional  growth regression for the fifteen republics.  While
we have not found republican  data to match the international  data in the Levine-Renelt  regression  we
presnted  In Section 1, we can do a similar cross-section  across republics. The results, presented  in
Table 8, are similar to those obtained in the standard  cross-country  regressions. The educational
variable  has a posidve coefficient,  while those on initial  incomne  (relative  to the Soviet  average) and
population  growth are negative. The coefficient  on population  growth is much larger than is normal  in
cross-country  regressions.
The coefficient  on initial relative  income implies  that the rate of convergence  between  the
Soviet republics  is over 4 percent per year (taking  the derivatives  at the Soviet  average). This implies  a
rate of intermal  convergence  for the Soviet republics  considerable  faster  than the convergence
coefficients  found by Barro and Sala i Martin (1992),  which are around 2 percent  per annum for both
US states an* a sample of 98 countries. Chua (1993)  shows  that convergence  is more ranid the lower
is the elasticity of substitution  between  capital and labor. The rapid convergence  of Soviet republics  to
each other (though admittedly  b. ed on the tenuous evidence  of 15 observations)  is yet another
confumation of the stronger force of dirninishing  retums (and possibly  the lower elasticity  of
substitution)  in the Soviet Union compared  to market economies.  19
1 9An altemnative  explanation  for faster convergence  among  Soviet  republics  is that  Soviet  policymakers  placed  more
emphasis  on regional  redistribution  than did Westem  policymakers.22
B) SECTOPiAL  PATTRNS  AND  PRODUCV/7  GROWTH  IN  THE  REPEUCS
Table 7 shows  enormous variations  in productivity  growth between  sctors  and republics; in
this section, we examine  whether  these variations  are related to degrees  of sectoral  distortion. It is well
known that the Soviet Union (and socialist  economies  in general) had distorted  sectoral structures  of
production  (Ofer (1987)). Ofer compared  the sector employment  and output  shares in the Soviet Union
to those that would have been expected  for a country of its pce capita income  level, using the patterns
of sectoral shares and income established  by Chenery, Robinson,  and Syrquin  (1986). He showed  that
the Soviet  services sector was smaller  than normal, Soviet  agriculture  was larger than normal, and
Soviet industry roughly normal for a country of its per eapita income level. The atrophied service
sector has been documented  also with recent data (Easterly, de Melo, and Ofer (1994)).
Table 9 shows the difference  between  the sectoral shares of employment  that would have been
predicted  by the republics' respective  per capita incomes  and their actual sectoral  shares. The per capita
incomes  are derived from the estimates  of relative incomes  by the World Bank, and then applied  to the
per capita income for the Soviet  Union  as a whole in Bergson  (1991b). The employment  shares of the
comparators  are taken from International  Labor Organization  (various years) for a sample  of about 70
developing  and developed  countries. We see the basic pattern confirmed:  agriculture  is larger than
average in all of the republics  for their respective  income  levels, and trade is smaller. Transport  is
larger than expected in the republics.  Industry  and construction  do not diverge  as sharply from the
expected  patterns. 20
Are the sector imbalances  related to relative  productivity  growth  performance?  The answer is
yes - sectors that were "too large" had poor productivity  growth. Figure 10 shows  a scatter of
productivity  growth 1970-90  for the 5 sectors and 15 republics  against  the sectoral employment
20These  measures  are  extremely  crude  and  obviously  reflect  other  factors  besides  "distortions".  For  example,  the
fertile  soils  of Ukraine  and Moldova  might  imply  a larger  agriculture  share  than  per  capita  income  alone  would
predict.  The  variation  in employment  shares  in  the intemational  data  set is enormous  and  the  residuais  shown  in
Table  10  are  generally  not  statistically  significant  in OLS  regressions  (with  the  exception  of many  of the  deviations
in republican  trade  shares).  The  sectoral  employment  deviations  nevertheless  remain  useful  descriptive  statistics  for
the  nature  of the  republican  economies.  Note  that  employment  statistics  cover  the  entire  economy,  and  so are
preferable  to NW shares  that  only  cover  the  material  sector  (not  to mention  the  pricing  problems).23
deviations  in 1970. Republican  agricultural  sectors that were above the predicted  employment  shares
also had poor (negative)  TFP growth, while industrial  and trade sectors below  predicted  shares of
employment  had positive  TFP growth. The slope coefficient  in figure 10 is -.11 (ten percentage  points
excess employment  share lowers TPP growth in that sector by 1.1  percentage  points). The coefficient  is
strongly significant. This result is reminiscent  of the finding in market economies  that distorted
sectoral price incentives  or other measures  of departure  from comparative  advantage  are negatively
related to growth (Barro (1991), Easterly  (1993), Edwards  (1989), Fischer (1993)).
III. Conclusion:  internretin the results on Soviet  Growth
Our results confirm  and update  the results of Weitzman  (1970) on the low Soviet  elasticity  of
substitution  between capital ard labor, which combined  with the Soviet  attempt  at extensive  growth, is
sufficient  to explain the decline  of Soviet  growth. The natural question  to ask is why Soviet  capital-
labor substitution  was more difficult  than in Westem market economies,  and whether  this difficulty  was
related to the Soviets' p!anned  economic  system.
Recent work on models  of endogenous  economic  growth stresses  the notion of a broad concept
of capital, including  human  capital, organizational  capitol,  and the stock of knowledge,  which can
substitute  easily for raw labor and perhaps replace  it altogether  (Rebelo 1991,  Jones and Manuelli
1992, Parente and Prescott 1991). Conversely,  one possible  explanation  for the Soviets' substitution
problems  would be that, under an autocratically  directed economic  system, they accumulated  a narrow
rather than a broad range of capital goods. Some forms  of physical  or human  capital that were missing
would  have been market-oriented  entrepreneurial  skilis, marketing  and distributional  skills, and
information-intensive  physical  and human  capital (because  of the restrictions  on information  flows). It
is more difficult  to substitute  more and more drill presses  for a laborer than it is to substitute  a drill
press plus a computerized  inventory  and distribution  system for a laborer. There is nothing  that
explicitly  supports this conjecture  in our results, but it is an interesting  direction  for further research.
The other message  from our results could  be that Soviet-style  stagnation  awaits  other countries
that have relied on extensive growth, a point that has been made forcefully  for those extensive  growers,
the East Asian Tigers, in several articles  by Young  (1992, 1993a, 1993b). After all, the USSR  had its24
period of rapid growth in the 30s through S0s when it appeared to be following  a linear output-cpital
production function,  as we have shown. If East Asian  capital-output  ratios keep rising until they reach
the extreme Soviet  levels, they too could experience  a drastic slowdown.  Even if diminiing  returns
are weaker in the East Asian economies  (if, following  our conjecture, they have been accumulatizn  a
broader range of capital goods and experiencing  higher  substitutability  between  capital and labor),
diminishing  returns would still eventually  cause a growth  slowdown. The Soviet  experience  can be
read as a particularly  cxtreme dramatization  of the long-run consequences  of extensive  growth. 21
The cross-section  results on republics,  although  based on a small number  of datapoints,  support
the idea that some cf the same factors  that are argued to determine  growth in the recent empirical
cross-saction  literature  - human  capital, population  growth, initial income, sectoral distorticns  - also
mattered  under Soviet  central planning. Our results with the Soviet  Union in the international  cross-
section growth regression indicate  that the planned  economic  system itself  was disastrous  for long-run
economic  growth in the USSR. While this point may now seem obvious, it was not so apparent in the
halcyon  days of the 1950s,  when the Soviet  case was  often cited as support for the neoclassical  model's
prediction  that distortions  do not have steady-state  growth  effects. Since  a heavy degree of planning
and govermnent  intervention  exists in many countries, especially  in developing  ones, the ill-fated  Soviet
experience  continues  to be of interest.
21Weitzman  (1990)  describes  Soviet  growth  (as  analyzed  by  Ofer  (1990))  as  the  best  application  of the  Solow
neoclassical  model  ever  seen.25
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Figure 1: Index of satisfaction with standard of living in USSR
reported in survey of emigres, 1983
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Figure 4:  Capital-output ratios,  Alternative  Estimates
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Figure  8:  Growth  and  Human  Capital,  Soviet Republics
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Figure 9:  Growth and Population Growth, Soviet Republics
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Table  1: Soviet Growth Data,  192847
Period  Industry,  official  |  Industy,  |  Material sectors,  |  Material  sctors,  1  Total economy,
Westerm  |hsnin  official  Western
Growth rates of output per worker, alternative estimates
1928-87  6.3%s  3.4%  2.1%  6.0%  3.0%
1928-39  12.S%  5.0%  0.9%  11.4%  2.9%
1940-49  0.1%  -1.S%  -1.0%  2.1%  1.9%
1950459  8.9%  6.2%  5.3%  8.3%  5.8%
1960-69  5.7%  2.8%  2.7%  5.4%  3.0%
1970-79  5.2%  3.4%  1.2%  4.1%  2.1%
1980-87  3.4%  1.S5%  0.2%  3.0%  1.4%
Growth rtes  of capital per worker, altermative  estimates
1928-87  6.2%  3.2%  2.3%  6.1%  4.9%
1928-39  11.9%  6.5%  S.9%  8.7%  S.7%
1940-49  1.5%  -0.1I  %  -1.3%  2.7%  1.5%
1950-59  8.0%  3.9%  3.5%  7.7%  7.4%
1960-69  6.1%  3.4%  3.8%  7.1%  5.4%
1970-79  6.3%  4.1%  1.9%  6.8%  5.0%
1980-87  S.6%  4.0%  -0.1 %  5.3%  4.0%
Note: growth rates ar- logntbmc  wrt-squares estimates.Table 2: The Soviet Union in the Levine-Renelt  (1992) Growth  Regression,  1960-89
Per capita
income, 1960  Population  Investment
Per capita  (Summers - growth,1960-  Secondary  ratio to GDP, Growth
growth, 1960-89  Heston PPP)  89  enrollment, 1960  1960-89  residual Average for sample excluding
Soviet Union  2.00  1792  2.07  21%  21%
Soviet Union  2.36  2796  1.05  58%  29%/e  -2.34
Rank of Soviet Union in
sample (out of 103
observations)  45  24  81  10  7  97
Sources: Datafor  all countries except Soviet Unionfrom Levine and Renelt (1992).
Soviet data:  Per capita growth--Western GDP described in text, updated to 1988-89 with Marer et al. (1992)
Per capita income--Bergson(1 991b)  for  1985 PPP, bockcast to 1960 with per capita growth infirst  column
Population growth: Feschbach (1983), Kingkade (1987), IMF et al. (1991). Marer et al. (1992)
Secondary education: UNESCO (1975 Statistical  Yearbook), 1970from  Marer et al. (1992)
Investment rate: Joint Economic Committee (1990), updated for 1988-89 with Marer et al. (1992) (JEC series available at 5 yr
intervalsfrom  1960-75, interpolated in between)
Growth residual: Residualfrom Levine-Renelt regression offirst  column on other columns
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Table  3: Soviet  defeme burden  a share of GDP
Jwa6 and  Gmws  Brda and  Gmvs
Oir  (1987)  (1988)  -High  (1988) - Low  Steinberg  (1990)
(cW'rent  rubles)  (constant  rubles)  (constant  rubles)  (constant  rubles)
1928  2%
1950  9%
1960  12%  13.34%  9.90%/
1961  13.86%  10.60%
1962  14.93%  11.39%
1963  15.49%  12.32%
1964  15.03%  12.17%
1965  14.49%  11.79%
1966  14.11%  11.54%
1967  14.40%  11.95%
1968  14.45%  12.14%
1969  14.61%  12.08%
1970  13%  13.83%  11.48%  13.28%
1971  13.56%  11.30%  13.76%
1972  13.80%  11.34%  13.61%
1973  13.33%  11.03%  13.14%
1974  13.71%  11.28%  13.15%
1975  14.14%  11.53%  13.57%
1976  14.32%  11.62%  13.30%/e
1977  14.07%  11.26%  12.98%
1978  14.00%  11.09%  13.08%
1979  14.53%  11.43%  13.05%
1980  16%  15.06%  11.82%  13.91%
1981  15.48%  11.75%  14.03%
1982  15.36%  11.70%  14.58%
1983  15.51%  11.63%  14.36%




Table  4: Toa factor  productivity  srowth  rmtu,  alteative smin, USSR
period  Khanin  Official  Westem  ot  Official  Weder  at.
material acton  material  industrial  indutrial  GNP
sectors  sctor  s_ctor
1928-40  -1.7  7.2  1.7  7.2  -1.2
1940-50  -0.2  2.5  -1.1  1.7  -0.2
19S040  3.8  6.0  6.1  4.1  1.3
1960-70  I.S  2.9  1.9  3.q  -0.1
1970-80  0.4  1.4  2.4  1.7  -0.8
1980-87  0.4  0.7  -0.1  1.1  -1.2
ounces:  seW  earlier  description  in text43
Table 5:  Elasitkis  of substtuton  and TFP growth with utmated CES  hmcdows
Watern
Xanln  Official  estfmata  Ocfidal
material  material  Industrial  Indiustrial  Western
sectors  sectors  sector  sector  GNP
For 1950L87  sampk:
Eaticity of subsitudon  1.11  0.37 *  0.13 *  0.40 *  0.37 *
TFP  grwth In:
1950-59  0.11%  2.93%  *  2.40% *  3.72%  *  1.09%  *
1960-69  -0.07%  2.88%  *  2.36% *  3.60%  *  1.10%  *
1970-79  -0.30%  2.98% *  2.51% *  3.74% *  1.16%  *
1980-87  -0.35%  2.92% *  2.43% *  3.62%  *  1.09%  *
For  entir sample  period, 1928-87
Easticity  of substitution  1.11  0.38 *  0.22  0.45 *  0.81
TFP  growth  In:
1928-39  -2.03%  *  3.34%  *  -1.38%  0.72%  -0.52%
1940-49  -1.17%  *  2.18% *  -0.72%  0.51%  -1.32%  *
1950-59  -0.18%  2.96  % *  0.36%  1.48%  *  -0.21%
196069  0.33%  2.97% *  0.40%  1.27%  -0.15%
1970-79  0.30%  3.05% *  0.43%  1.38%  -0.18%
1980-87  0.22%  2.97% *  0.37%  1.28%  -0.33%
Notes: * indicates  elasticity  of substitution  significantly  different  than one  or TFP growth
rates  significantly  different  than  zero. Full regression  results  given  in appendix.44
Table  6: Growtb  rats of NM? pew  worker  1970-90  cmoutt prkc  ________
_  Total  Industry  Agriculture  Trasort  n&  Construcimon  Trade  &
_ Commurncation  Procurelment
USSR  2.8%  3.4%  -1.3%  3.1%  2.7%  _  2.1%
Slavic:  .
Russia  3.0%  3.5%  -2.1%  3.2%  3.1%  2.4%
Ukraine  2.9%  3.2%  0.3%  3.1%  2.2%  2.2%
Belarus  4.5%  5.4%  0.3%  3.5%  2.9%  2.4%
Baltic/Moldavian:
Estonia  3.1%  3.8%  -1.7%  3.6% J  2.6%  2.5%
Latvia  3.3%  4.3%  -0.8%  5.6%  1.0%  2.0%
Lithuania  2.8%  4.9%  -0.6  %  3.9%  1.4%  1.0%
Moldova  3.3%  3.3%  0.5%  4.1%  2.2%  2.4%
Transcaucasian:
Georgia  3.9%  4.5%  2.5%  3.1%  2.0%  2.5%
Armenia  3.4%  3.4%  -0.8%  5.2%  2.7%  2.5%
Azerbaijan  2.7%  3.9%  1.9%  0.7%  2.7%  1.6%
Central  Asian:
Kazakhstan  0.7%  0.6%  -4.4%  1.9%  1.9%  0.4%
Turkmenistan  -0.3%  -0.6%  -2.8%  0.9%  1.6%  1.4%
Uzbekistan  1.2%  2.2%  -1.8%  2.7%  1.0%  1.8%
Tajikstan  1.0%  1.7%  -1.8%  3.1%  0.6%  1.8%
Kyrgyzstan  1.7%  3.1%  -2.4%  3.8%  1.4%  1  .1 %45
Tablh 7: Total  factor  productivtty  growth  by sector  and  republik,  197O.90
Total  lndusuy  Apictlnws  Transport  &  Conm  ucdton  Trade  &
___________  ______Cormnmunication  Procurement
USSR  0.8%  1.1%  -4.1%  0.8%  0.2%  0.3%
SOWic:
Runsia  |  0.8%  0.9%  -5.3%  0.7%  0.5%  0.4%
Ukraine  1.0%  1.3%  .2.7%  1.0%  -0.4%  0.6%
Belau  2.1%  3.0;  -3.3%  1.3%  1.8%  0.3%
Blaic/MoldaWan:
Estonia  1.3%  1.8%  -4.4%  1.6_%  0.2_%  O.S_  %
LAuvia  1.4%  2.1%  -3.3%  2.9%  -0.9  %  0.2  %
Lithuania  0.6%  2.6%  -4.0%  2.0%  -0.9%  -0.6%
Moldova  1.0%  1.2%  -2.7%  2.0%  -0.4%  0.5%
Tscaucasian:
Georgia  2.3%  2.6%  |  0.1%  1.3%  0.3%  1.0%
Armenia  1.8% j  1.8%  -3.1% J  2.8%  1.1%  0.4%
Azerbaijan  1.4%  2.5%  X  0.1%  -1.2%  0.3%  -0.2%
Central  Asian:
Kazakhstan  -1.1%  -1.5%  -6.4%  0.2%  -0.3%  -1.2%
Turkmenistan  -2.0%  -3.0% I  -4.0%  -2.1%  -0.3%  -0.3%
Uzbekistan  -0.4%  0.5%  -3.7%  0.6%  -0.6%  -0.1  %
Tajikstan  -0.4%  -0.3% T  -2.9%  1.8%  -1.1%  0.9%
Kyrgyzstan  0.2%  1.1%  -3  .9%  1.7%  -0.2%  -0.7%
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Table 8: Cross-secdonal growth regresion,  15 Soviet repubUcs
m.uu..uu.m.u.u.  u  u..mumnm..  m  m.u..munu..u
LS // Dependent Variable is Total Factor Productivity Growth,1970-90
Number of observations: 15
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD. ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL SIG.
C  0.0303710  0.0244123  1.2440874  0.2393
SPECHI65  0.0001098  5.011E-05  2.1910647  0.0509
INCOM60  -0.0002895  0.0001477  -1.9598548  0.0758
NATINC70  -1.4371064  0.5552033  -2.5884325  0.0252
R-squared  0.686424  Mean of dependent var  0.006709
Adjusted R-squared  0.600904  S.D. of dependent var  0.012018
S.E. of regression  0.007592  Sum of squared resid  0.000634




SPECHI65  - number of specialists  with higher  education  per 10,000  inhabitants,  1965
INCOM60 - income per capita relative  to USSR, 1960
NATINC70  -rate of natural increase  of population, 1970
Source: official  data.47
Table  9: Sectoral  employment  Imbalances  by republic
DeviationJfom employment  shares  predicted by per capita income,  1970
Transport
Industry  Construction  Agriculture  and comm  Trade
USSR  3%  1%  6%  2%  -7%
Slavic:
Russia  6%  1%  1%  2%  -7%
Ukraine  2%  0%  11%  1%  .8%
Belarus  .1%  0%  17%  0%  -8%
Baltic/Moldavian:
Estonia  7%  2%  3%  3%  -7%
Latvia  7%  0%  4%  2%  -7%
Lithuania  1%  2%  14%  1%  -9%
Moldova  .9%  -1%  29%  -1%  -9%
Transcaucasian:
Georgia  -6%  0%  16%  1%  -8%
Armenia  3%  3%  4%  0%  -8%
Azerbaijan  -4%  1%  10%  2%  -7%
Central Asian:
Kazakhstan  -4%  3%  6%  4%  -7%
Turkmenistan  -11%  3%  16%  2%  -7%
Uzbekistan  -9%  1%  19°%  0%  -7%
Tajikstan  -9%  0%  20%  0%  -8%
Kyrgyzstan  -3%  0%  11%  1%  -7%
Sources:  International  Labor Organization  (various  years)for international
employment  data; see textfor sources  on Soviet republics
Note: Share deviations are calculated by regressing employment shares in 1970 for
non-socialist countries on 1970 per capita income (Summers-Heston), dummying out
the Soviet republics.48
Appendix 1: Trends in capital-output ratios in growth accounting atdiu
Per  annwn  percent  change  in
County  Period  capital  output  ratio
This  paper
USSR (Western  GDP and Capital Stock  Estimates)  1950-87  2.53%
Maddison  (1989)
France  1950-84  .0.45%
Germany  1950-84  0.16%
Japan  1950-84  -0.91%
United  Kingdom  1950-84  0.62%
United  States  1950-84  .0.07%
China  1950-84  2.48%
India  1950-84  1.54%
Korea  1950-84  0.03%
Taiwan  1950-84  -0.34%
Argentina  1950-84  0.61Y
Brazil  1950-84  0.86%
Chile  1950-84  -0.22%
Mexico  1950-84  0.50%
USSR  1950-84  3.75%
Yowig (1993)
Hong  Kong  1966-91  0.84%
Singapore  1970-90  2.79s
South Korea (excluding  agriculture)  1966-90  3.62%
Taiwan  (excluding  agriculture)  1966-90  2.55%
Kim  and Lau (1993)
Hong  Kong  66-90  1.11%
Singapore  64-90  1.38%
South Korea  60-90  3.50Y
Taiwan  53-90  3.13%
France  57-90  0.68%
W. Germany  60-90  1.16%
Japan  57-90  3.19%
U.K.  57-90  0.68%
U.S.  48-90  -0.19¶/'
Ela  (1992)
Argentina  1950-80  0.39f
Brazil  1950-80  -0.54%
Chile  1950-80  -0.39%/0
Colombia  1950-80  -0.79%
Mexico  1950-80  0.44%
Per  1950-80  1.22%
Venezuela  1950-80  0.75%49
Trads in apital-output  ratdos  in  growth  aceoutldg  studis  (Appeudix  I conL)
Per annum  percent change  in
Counny  Period  capital  output  ratio
Chenery, Robinson,_and Syrquin (1986)
Canada  47-73  0.66%
France  50-73  0.13%
Genmany  50-73  0.33%
Italy  52-73  -0.63%
Netherlands  51-73  0.17%
United Kingdom  49-73  0.69%
United States  49-73  0.00%
Benhabib  and Spiegel (1992) (using  Summers  -Heston  data)
United States  1965-85  0.63%
Japan  1965-85  2.56%
Hong Kong  1965-85  -0.20OYo
Korea  1965-85  2.78%
Singapore  1965-85  2.41%
Taiwan  1965-85  2.97%
75th  percentile of sample (77 countries  in sample,
excluding  Africa)  1965-85  1.72%
50th percentile  1965-85  0.80%
25th  percentile  1965-85  0.21%
Nehru  and Dhareshwar  (1993) (World  Bank data)
United  States  1950-90  0.20%
Japan  1950-90  2.70%
Korea  1950-90  3.70%
Singapore  1960-90  -1.09%
Taiwan  1950-90  -2.08%
75th  percentile of sample (72 countries  in sample)  1950-90  1.64%
50th  percentile  1950-90  1.06%
25th  percentile  1950-90  0.38%
KI.ng  and Levine (1994)  (Summers-Heston  data)
United  States  1950-88  0.40%
Japan  1950-88  2.33%
Hong  Kong  1950-88  -0.80/o
Korea  1950-88  3.05%
Singapore  1950-88  2.94%
Taiwan  1950-88  2.63%
75th  percentile of sample of 74 countries  excluding
Africa  1950-88  1.69%
50thpercentile  1950-88  0.95%
25th  percentile  1950-88  0.23%Appendix  2:  Nonlinear  1WM  squars esImaon of CU  h  _om
Variable  name for nHonllnr  regressionl
dummy  for 1928.39  D2839
dummy  for 1940-49  D4049
dummy  for 1950-59  D5059
dummy  for 1960-69  D6069
dummy  for 1970-79  D7079
dummy  for 1980-87  D8087
Capital-labor  ratio, industry,  official  KLINO
Capital-labor  ratio,  industry,  KLINW
Western  est
Capital-labor  ratio,  Khanin  KLKHAN
Capital-labor  ratio,  material  sectors,  KLOFF
oMcal
Capital-labor  ratio, whole  economy,  KLWES
Wtstern
Log  of output  per worker,  industrial  LYLINO
sector,  official  numnbers
Log  of output  per worker,  industrial  LYLINW
sector,  Westeu estimates
Log  of output  per worker,  material  LYLKHAN
sectors,  Khanin
Log  of output  per worker,  material  LYLOFF
sectors,  official
Log  of output  per worker,  whole  LYLWES







Ratio  of defense  spending  to GDP  DEFGDP
TIME  (1,2,3,4,ETC.)  TIME(1) Results for 1928V7 ample
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NLS //  Dependent Variable  is LYLKHMAN
SMPL  range:  1928  - 1987
Number of observations:  60
LYLKHAN-C(1)*T2839+C(2)*T4049+C(3)*T5059+C(4)*T6069+C(5)*T7079+C(6)*T808
7+C(7)*LOG(C(S)*KLKHANA(1/C(7))+1-C(8))+C(9)
......... m..  mamma  am....  ma.  - -mmmaumumamma.-  a  m  a  amam..  - mm-.-umm
COEFFICIENT  STD. ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL SIG.
C(1)  -0.0202626  0.0073460  -2.7583265  0.0080
C(2)  -0.0116552  0.0034600  -3.3685319  0.0014
C(3)  -0.0017588  0.0025248  -0.6966280  0.4892
C(4)  0.0033136  0.0029598  1.1195481  0.2682
C(5)  0.0030160  0.0031696  0.9515282  0.3458
C(6)  0.0022460  0.0029139  0.7707873  0.4444
C(7)  9.8304594  113.76212  0.0864124  0.9315
C(S)  0.6102850  0.1464251  4.1678994  0.0001
C(9)  0.0916414  0.0363921  2.5181703  0.0150
R-squared  0.983100  Mean of dependent var  0.471133
Adjusted R-squared  0.980450  S.D. of dependent var  0.397586
S.E. of regression  0.055592  Sum of squared resid  0.157612
Log likelihood  93.12259  F-statistic  370.8535
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.024675  Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
NLS // Dependent Variable  is LYLOFF
SMPL  range:  1928  - 1987
Number of observations:  60
LYLOFF -C(1)*T2839+C(2)*T4049+C(3)*T5059+C(4)*T6069+C(5)*T7079+C(6)*T808
7+C(7)*LOG(C(8)*KiOFFA (1/C(7))+1-C(S))+C(9)
COEFFICIENT  STD. ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL SIG.
ama  a  a  a a  a....  a  a  a  a  mamma  a  ama  mamma  mum  mmma  a  mama  a  a  aa  a  a  mamma  a  a  mammaS a..m..mamma.a  a  a
C(1)  0.0333843  0.0080809  4.1312477  0.0001
C(2)  . 0.0218378  0.0044657  4.8901520  0.0000
C(3)  0.0296170  0.0047890  6.1844430  0.0000
C(4)  0.0296679  0.0059473  4.9884344  0.0000
C(S)  0.0304758  0.0058937  5.1708799  0.0000
C(6)  0.0297401  0.0054773  5.4296908  0.0000
C(7)  -0.6260722  0.1706363  -3.6690441  0.0006
C(S)  0.5403918  0.1322528  4.0860527  0.0002
C(9)  1.3706613  0.1645207  8.3312377  0.0000
R-uquared  0.996612  Mean of dependent var  2.117937
Adjusted  R-squared  0.996080  S.D. of dependent var  1.061674
S.E. of regression  0.066469  Sum of squared resid  0.225327
Log likelihood  82.40014  F-statistic  1875.115
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.101054  Prob(F-scatistic)  0.000000
a  mmmaa  aa  amama.  mama  am  a  a  a  amm,  a  a  amm  mmmaa  mmmaamaa  a  ma  a  aassssssst=sNLS // Dependent Variable  is LYLWES  52
Date: 7-20-1993 /  Time: 23:35
SMPL range: 1928  - 1987
Number of observations:  60
LYLWES -C(1)*T2839+C(2)*T4049+C(3)*T5059+C(4)*T6069+C(5)*T7079+C(6)*T806
7+C(7)*LOG(C(8)*KLWES^(1/C(7))+1-C(S))+C(9)
Convergence  achieved after 2 iterations
mumm-m  u.-  u.mu  m.mu......mu.  m....  ua  U.UUU  r..  mm......................  mum--  ur......- 
COEFFICIENT  STD. ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL SIG.
m...u..................m......  m..........m...m.m......................n.m  m....
C(1)  -0.0051988  0.0086239  -0.6028340  0.5493
C(2)  -0.0131666  0.0045147  -2.9163642  0.0033
C(3)  -0.0020808  0.0048916  -0.4253758  0.6724
C(4)  -0.0014649  0.0058862  -0.2488673  0.8045
C(S)  -0.0018068  0.0059853  -0.3018751  0.7640
C(6)  -0.0033362  0.0060313  -0.5531465  0.5826
C(7)  -4.1327746  5.8211962  -0.7099528  0.4810
C(S)  0.7331452  0.1523563  4.8120442  0.0000
C(9)  -0.2293690  0.0861945  -2.6610638  0.0104
mu....  mm...un...  mmm...m...  ma  mm  m..  m  u......  mm
R-squared  0.989484  Mban of dependent var  0.934737
Adjusted R-squared  0.987835  S.D. of dependent var  0.549799
S.E. of regression  0.060641  Sum of squared resid  0.187543
Log likelihood  87.90639  F-statistic  599.8574
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.118814  Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
NLS // Dependent Variable  is LYLINW
SMPL  range:  1928  - 1987
Number of observations:  60
LYLINW -C(1)*T2839+C(2)*T4049+C(3)*T5059+C(4)*T6069+C(5)*T7079+C(6)*T803
7+C(7)*LOG(C(8)*KLINwA (1/C(7))+1-C(S))+C(9)
mm..  m  mm.m....  m.  mm.......  rn.....mm..m.m.m...  mm....mm.....m.....  mm......  m.  m
COEFFICIENT  STD. ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL SIG.
C(1)  -0.0137604  0.0079630  -1.7280338  0.0900
C(2)  -0.0071615  0.0038608  -1.8549179  0.0694
C(3)  0.0035802  0.0026946  1.3286169  0.1899
C(4)  0.0040201  0.0038213  1.0520246  0.2977
C(S)  0.0043616  0.0051544  0.8461905  0.4014
C(6)  0.0036720  0.0054903  0.6688182  0.5066
C(7)  -0.2743993  0.3211317  -0.8544760  0.3968
C(8)  0.3542810  0.3325082  1.0654807  0.2917
C(9)  -1.2839549  0.3090338  -4.1547401  0.0001
,,,,,m.u  m.....  mmm.mum.....  mm.-.-m---mmmm....m...mum.
R-squared  0.979397  Mean  of dependent var  -1.911255
Adjusted  R-squared  0.976165  S.D. of dependent var  0.610544
S.E. of regression  0.094259  Sum of squared resid  0.453126
Log likelihood  61.44156  F-statistic  303.0437
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.034563  Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
u  mmm....  mm.m..  m.m...mm...m...  mm...m..mu..NLS  // Dependent  Variable  is LYLINO  53
Date:  7-20-1993  /  Time:  23:38
SMPL  range:  1928  - 1987
Number  of  observations:  60
LYLINO  -C(1)*T2839+C(2)*T4049+C(3)*TS059+C(4)*T6069+C(S)*T7079+C(6)*T808
7*C(7)*LOG(C(8)  *KLINOA (1/C(7)  )+1-C(8)  )+C(9)
Convergence  achieved  after  2 iterations
uummmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmminmummmummuummmmmmmminu=uuinmmuuminumumummuummmm
COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIG.
C(1)  0.0072341  0.0086047  0.8407205  0.4044
C(2)  0.0051121  0.0053042  0 9637879  0.3397
C(3)  0.0148348  0.0050212  2.9544124  0.0047
C(4)  0.0126798  0.0064987  1.9511147  0.0565
C(5)  0.0137831  0.0069631  1.9794368  0.0532
C(6)  0.0128241  0.0069723  1.8392831  0.0717
C(7)  -0.8243762  0.3706599  -2.2240773  0.0306
C(8)  0.4472637  0.1562502  2.8624840  0.0061
C(9)  -1.4963393  0.37q1015  -3.9470674  0.0002
----------- s---  mwmmmum  m  mmmm=mmmmuummmmmmmmmmmmmmmuu-w.Sumi==nmmu==
R-squared  0.996675  Mean  of dependent  var  -2.191933
Adjusted  R-squared  0.996154  S.D.  of dependent  ver  1.111757
S.E.  of  regression  0.068948  Sum of  squared  resid  0.242448
Log  likelihood  80.20302  F-statistic  1911.111
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.317886  Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
(2) Results  for  1950-87  4mmpIe
NLS  // Dependent  Variable  is LYLKHAN
SMPL  range:  1950  - 1987
Number  of  observations:  38
LYLKHANmC(1)*T5059+C(2)*T6069+C(3)*T7079+C(4)*T8087+C(5)*LOG(C(6)*KLKHAN
A(1/C(S))+1-C(6))+C(7)
COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIG.
C(1)  0.0011270  0.0048291  0.2333864  0.8170
C(2)  -0.0006563  0.0051628  -0.1271136  0.8997
C(3)  -0.0030198  0.0050557  -0.5972997  0.5546
C(4)  -0.0034716  0.0045055  -0.7705352  0.4468
C(S)  9.7629283  220.16876  0.0443429  0.9649
C(6)  1.1237026  0.2228861  5.0415996  0.0000
C(7)  -0.1735591  0.1109200  -1.5647225  0.1278
mmmm...................  u.............mum..............mum...........  m  mu  mu  u  u  =. mum...  mu  m  m  =  mum.....  mu  m..  mum,.
R-squared  0.987796  Mean  of dependent  var  0.707439
Adjusted  R-squared  0.985434  S.D.  of dependent  var  0.305213
S.E.  of  regression  0.036836  Sum  of squared  resid  0.042064
Log  likelihood  75.39730  F-statistic  418.1935
Durhin-Watson  stat  0.505965  Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
mum...........  mum  mum  mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm...........m...mm.m,  mmm  m....mmm....mm.m54
NLS // Depenoent Variable  is LYLOFF
SMPL range: 1950  - 1987
Number of observations:  38
LYLOFF -C(1)*T5059+C(2)*T6069+C(3)*T7079+C(4)*T8087+C(5)*LOQ(C(6)*KLOFF*
(1/C(5))+1-C(6))+C(7)
COEFFICIENT  STD. ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL SIG.
C(1)  0.0292335  0.0027887  10.482690  0.0000
C(2)  0.0288169  0.0029999  9.6060223  0.0000
C(3)  0.0297372  0.0030072  9.8888315  0.0000
C(4)  0.0291584  0.0028214  10.334843  0.0000
C(S)  -0.5812015  0.0565917  -10.270078  0.0000
C(6)  0.5715239  0.0456052  12.531981  0.0000
C(7)  1.3912334  0.0869462  16.001090  0.0000
R-squared  0.999488  Mean  of dependent var  2.812825
Adjusted R-squared  0.999389  S.D. of dependent var  0.594913
S.E. of regression  0.014707  Sum of squared resid  0.006705
Log likelihood  110.2862  F-statistic  10084.79
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.390053  Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
na.....  nm.....  m.  ann  mmnam  maanmn  aama,amm....  an  --.-.
NLS // Dependent Variable  is LYLWES
SMPL range: 1950  - 1987
Number of observations:  38
LYLWES =C(1)*T5059+C(2)*T6069+C(3)*T7079+C(4)*T8087+C(5)*LOG(C(6)*KLWESA
(1/C(5)  )+1-C(6)  )  +C(7)
COEFFICIENT  STD. ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL SIG.
C(1)  0.0109709  0.0032629  3.3623384  0.0021
C(2)  0.0109651  0.0035797  3.0631462  0.0045
C(3)  0.0116165  0.0035835  3.2417041  0.0028
C(4)  0.0109505  0.0034259  3.1963828  0.0032
C(S)  -0.5958245  0.0966218  -6.1665625  0.0000
C(6)  0.9598616  0.0134483  71.373976  0.0000
C(7)  -0.8162872  0.0832581  -9.8042949  0.0000
m..a  mmm  .mmnan  m.mnu.a  m.  mm..  m......  aaa....,  m......  mm....  ns
R-squared  0.998747  Mean of dependent var  1.285964
Adjusted R-squared  0.998505  S.D. of dependent var  0.356312
S.E. of regression  0.013777  Sum of squared resid  0.005884
Log likelihood  112.7701  F-statistic  4119.769
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.922959  Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
a..anm....  mna...  m...am....  m  n...  a..aa...  m,.  ..  m....,  naa  wm NLS //  Dependent Variable  is LYLINW  55
SMPL  range:  1950  - 1987
Number of observations:  38
LYLINW .C(1)*T5059+C(2)*T6069+C(3)*T7079+C(4)*T8087+C(S)*LOG(C(6)*KLINWA
(1/C(S))+1-C(6))+C(7)
------------------  n....mm.  -m.  .m....  m...fu....  -m..........
COEFFICIENT  STD. ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL SIG.
.m...  ..........................  .............. m......mm...m.........  m.........
C(1)  0.0240169  0.0021467  11.187968  0.0000
C(2)  0.0236218  0.0023585  10.015738  0.0000
C(3)  0.0251244  0.0021509  11.681057  0.0000
C(4)  0.0243103  0.0018522  13.124830  0.0000
C(S)  -0.1441544  0.0330823  -4.3574480  0.0001
C(6)  0.0020469  0.0031944  0.6407644  0.5264
C(7)  -2.4449147  0.1045291  -23.389801  0.0000
R-squared  0.997683  Mean of dependent var  -1.535708
Adjusted R-squared  0.997234  S.D. of dependent var  0.417767
S.E. of regression  0.021971  Sum of squared resid  0.014965
Log likelihood  95.03323  F-statistic  2224.312
Durbin-Watson  stat  0.506999  Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
NLS // Dependent Variable  is LYLINO
SMPL  range:  1950  - 1987
Number of observations:  38
LYLINO -C(l)*T5059+C(2)*T6069+C(3)*T7079+C(4)*T8087+C(5)*LOG(C(6)*KLINO^
(1/C(s)  )+1-C(6)  )+C(7)
COEFFICIENT  STD. ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL SIG.
m..u....m  m...mmunau....  m_...  m...am......  mm.,.,mm.
C(1)  0.0371878  0.0049959  7.4436178  0.0000
C(2)  0.0359650  0.0053985  6.6619911  0.0000
C(3)  0.0373821  0.0054797  6.8219713  0.0000
C(4)  0.0361438  0.0052913  6.8308024  0.0000
C(5)  -0.6618038  0.1296726  -5.1036531  0.0000
C(6)  0.1022757  0.0669595  1.5274265  0.1368
C(7)  -2.7672364  0.2907247  -9.5184097  0.0000
................  m...  mm..um  .. u....m..  .m.m.mu.mUu  m.m.m....................mm...................  mum
R-squared  0.999228  Mean of dependent var  -1.481138
Adjusted  R-squared  0.999079  S.D. of dependent var  0.657494
S.E. of regression  0.019953  Sum of squared resid  0.012342
Log likelihood  98.69529  F-statistic  6690.964
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.008779  Prob(F-statistic)  0.00000056
(a) Regrsian  wth  Defense  qpmndfng/rnP
NLS // Dependent Variable  is LYLWES
SMPL  range:  1960  - 1987
Number of observations:  28
LYLWES-C(1)*TIME+C(2)*TIME*DEFGDP+C(3)*LOG(C(4)*KLWESA(1/C(3))+1-C(4))+C
(5)
mmm  u  u  mN--m..  m.....m..  mm m  mm mmmm  am  a  m.......  mm,  mmmm.m.m.,  mm
COEFFICIENT  STD. ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL SIG.
mm.....  m...  mmmmmmmmmam...ammmmmmmiam.mmmmmmmammmmmmm
C(l)  0.0207134  0.0059611  3.4747771  0.0021
C(2)  -0.0727455  0.0108381  -6.7120112  0.0000
C(3)  -0.5785414  0.2470464  -2.3418330  0.0282
C(4)  0.9690962  0.0396033  24.470094  0.0000
C(5)  -0.8963781  0.2645463  -3.3883604  0.0025
R-squared  0.996629  Mean of dependent  var  1.468442
Adjusted R-squared  0.996042  S.D. of dep)endent  var  0.179790
S.E. of regression  0.011310  Sum of squaied resid  0.002942
Log likelihood  88.52034  F-statistic  1699.821
Durbin-Watson  stat  2.232942  Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
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